





Eugene Halton. 1992. The Cultic Roots of Culture. In Theory of Culture. Edited by   








The Cultic Roots of Culture 
Eugene Halton 
. . . man, proud man, 
Drest in a little brief authority, 
Most ignorant of what he's most assur'd, 
His glassy essence, like an angry ape, 
Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven 
As makes the angels weep. 
—Shakespeare, Measure for Measure, act 2, scene 2 
 
"Sleep-pictures" 
—New word coined in sign language by an ape to describe what it did at night. 
 
A little knowledge is indeed a dangerous thing. No age proves it more than ours. Monkey chatter 
is at last the most disastrous of all things. 
—D. H. Lawrence, Etruscan Places 
 
What is culture? The usual way of answering this question is to trace the modern history of the 
"culture concept" from E. B. Tylor to the present. Such a history can be quite revealing, because 
the culture concept itself is a cultural indicator of the major intellectual tendencies and battles 
over the past century. The joint statement in 1958 by A. L. Kroeber and Talcott Parsons on 
culture formalized a kind of a truce between structural functionalism and cultural anthropology, 
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ratified by the two leading proponents of each camp (some may have regarded it as what in 
business is called a "hostile takeover attempt" of the culture concept by Parsons, although 
"corporate merger" might be a more apt expression). 
The culture concept, now a hotly contested topic for sociologists (as perhaps signified by the 
theme of this book), remains a profound indicator of contemporary intellectual culture. Although 
academic sociology has finally seemed to acknowledge the importance of culture, as seen in the 
recent creation of cultural sociology sections of the German and American sociological 
associations in the past few years, this does not at all ensure that the concern with culture will 
animate new directions for theory. The very term culture is so indeterminate that it can easily be 
filled in with whatever preconceptions a theorist brings to it. 
Indeed, the sociology of the new culture section in the American association suggests that the 
objectivist and positivist prejudices of mainstream American sociology are appropriating the 
"soft" concept of culture by making it "hard." A peculiar irony of this development is that the 
objectivists share a tendency with relativists to view culture in purely conventional terms. Hence 
the inner social aspects of culture—subjective meanings, aesthetic qualities of works of art or 
common experience, the "spontaneous combustion" of new ways of feeling, doing, and 
conceiving—are either proclaimed to be not sociological, reduced to external considerations, or 
are virtually ignored. The outer aspects, the externals of culture, such as reputations, "tool kit" 
strategies of action, social networks, and production standards, although admittedly social, are 
enlarged to cover the whole meaning of culture (for example, Becker 1982; Swidler 1986; 
Griswold 1987; Wuthnow 1987). The result is that culture legitimates new topics of study while 
simultaneously being tamed to meet the expectations of actually existing sociology: old wine 
comes out of new bottles, and we remain, to paraphrase Shakespeare, most ignorant of what 
we're most assur'd, our glassy social essence. 
By beginning with a brief tour of the contemporary landscape of culture theory, I hope to show 
how current conceptions of meaning and culture tend toward extreme forms of abstraction and 
disembodiment, indicating an alienation from the original, earthy meaning of the word culture , I 
will then turn to the earlier meanings of the word and why the "cultic," the living impulse to 
meaning, was and remains essential to a conception of culture as semiosis or sign-action. Putting 
the "cult" back in culture requires a reconception of the relations between human biol- 
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ogy and meaning, and I touch on this by looking at dreaming as a borderland between biology 
and culture, a thoroughly social, yet private, experience. Dreaming not only highlights the cultic 
roots of culture—the spontaneous impulse to meaning—but also illustrates one way in which the 
technics of the biosocial human body forms the primary source of culture. Sociologists have 
seldom considered dreaming itself, perhaps because it seems nonsocial. Yet I will attempt to 
show why dreaming, although private, is a thoroughly cultural, biological, communicative 
activity. The deepest implications of this chapter are that contemporary modern culture in 
general, and intellectual culture in particular, have unnecessarily narrowed our conceptions of 
meaning and culture and that by undertaking a broad historical reconstruction of human 
consciousness and communication—known in the German context as philosophical 
anthropology —we can see why culture seeps into our very biological constitution: cultus , the 
impulse to meaning. 
A Report to the Academy 
In Franz Kafka's "A Report to an Academy," an ape gives a lecture on his acquisition of 
symbolic consciousness. He describes his long months in a tiny iron cage on board the ship that 
brought him to occidental civilization and the unbearable loneliness that tortured him into a state 
of cultivation. Becoming communicative, as he put it, was his "only way out." He learned to 
become rational, to communicate, to drink schnapps and wine. He became socialized into a 
"cultural system," and, in ways quite consistent with what most contemporary theorists of culture 
believe, he became utterly estranged from his animal nature. Thus, when presented with a female 
ape mate, he could only see "the insane look of the bewildered half-broken animal in her eye," a 
dimwitted unconscious creature of nature, uncivilized, incapable of drinking wine, let alone 
schnapps. 
I would like to propose Kafka's ape, this hairy biped virtually reduced to talking, as the ideal type 
of ethereal creature proposed by most contemporary theories of culture. This creature, regardless 
of whether one reads of him in structuralist, poststructuralist, or critical accounts, or in structural-
functionalist and neofunctionalist ones, is a product of unfeeling systems; his or her actions 
thoroughly stamped with the impress of an inorganic, rational system. 
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The proponents of Kafka's ape usually assume that meaning is a systemic property, that 
signification forms a logical system, and that culture is a code for order. Even the antirationalist 
opposite proposed by some "postmodern" theorists, such as Jean Baudrillard, Jean-Francois 
Lyotard, and Jacques Derrida, remains tethered to the structuralist logic it acts out against and 
infected with the old Cartesian "ghost in the machine" dichotomy: the ethereal ape of deep 
structural code and poststructural fission, without presence; his or her body reduced to a text. 
When Lyotard proclaims his pseudorevolutionary postmodernism, "Let us wage a war on 
totality; let us be witnesses to the unpresentable; let us activate the differences and save the 
honor of the name," we see merely another avatar of what painter Ernst Fuchs has called the 
invisible dictator , a servant of the ghost in the machine mentality of modernity who happens to 
reside on the ethereal side of the dichotomy. If modernity is characterized as cultural nominalism 
(Rochberg-Halton 1986)—a dichotomous worldview that falsely divides thoughts from things, 
producing an ethereal conception of mind and a materialized conception of nature—then we can 
well understand why Lyotard suddenly waxes nostalgic to "save the honor," not of a flesh and 
blood creature but of "the name" itself in its abstract generality. 
The same etherealizing and mechanizing tendencies reside on the other half of the great divide of 
cultural nominalism, for humanity incarnate is also the unacknowledged enemy of many current 
biologically based theories of culture, such as those of human ethology or sociobiology. The 
seeming antithesis to the ethereal ape of structuralism and poststructuralism, the so-called natural 
man of ethology and sociobiology, likewise shares a domination by the calculating character of 
modern rationality. Like Caliban of The Tempest , that nasty and brutish subhuman, the creature 
of ethology and sociobiology is all appetite and impulsive greed. Yet these Hobbesian "state of 
nature" emotions are themselves façades for a cunning, underlying, rational genetic choice 
theory. Indeed structuralism, poststructuralism, rational-choice theory, and the rational 
calculation imputed to the genes by sociobiology are only apparently opposed; inwardly they 
speak the same disembodied language. The incarnate human body, with its stored capacities of 
memory and tempered abilities to suffer experience and engender meaning, is epiphenomenal in 
the sociobiologists' accounts; all that truly matters is the ethereal rational self-interest and its 
total willy-nilly maximalization (Rochberg-Halton 1989a). 
We see the same ethereal language, albeit in a different dialect, in 
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those theories that view culture as "a system of symbols and meanings," as though system were 
the be-all and end-all of culture and human action. Such theories claim to do justice to the 
systematic nature of human signification, but in reality they grossly exaggerate those aspects of 
signification concerning conceptual systems—as though culture were a domain of knowledge 
instead of a way of living—while ignoring or distorting those aspects of signification that reside 
outside the boundaries of rationality and systems. These latter forms of significatory experience 
include dreaming, imaginative projection, lived and suffered experience and its contingencies—
what Charles Peirce termed iconic (or qualitative ) signs and indexical signs (signs of physicality 
or existence)—as well as symbolic signs that are conceived within a living context and a larger 
purport beyond the narrow confines of system and rationality. 
In founding modern semiotics toward the end of the nineteenth century, Peirce proposed that 
signification occurs through three modalities of being. He demonstrated logically not only why 
signs can represent their objects qualitatively, existentially, and conventionally but also why all 
three modalities are inherently social (Rochberg-Halton 1986). His existential signs, or indexical 
signs, are therefore fundamentally unlike the positivist notion of semantic reference, with which 
they are sometimes confused. Similarly, iconic signs, in being wholly within semiosis, or sign-
action, convey essences , or the qualities of their objects, within the social process of 
interpretation. Iconic signs may exist within social conventions, yet are not reducible to 
conventional signification. Both advocates and critics of essentialism tend to view essences as 
outside of the realm of signs, yet Peirce's concept of iconic signs undercuts both positions. Such 
nonconventional modalities of signification are fundamental to a vital culture and civilization, I 
claim, though they may fall outside the pale of conventionalist theories. 
In the etherealized language of contemporary theory, the "natural" human of sociobiology and 
the "cultural" one of individualistic or systematic conceptualism are equally divested of organic 
nature and personhood. Even an ape can see that these creatures are simply lackeys of 
rationalism, ignorant of their "glassy essence." 
Culture theory is facing the problem portrayed in the 1950s American science fiction movie, The 
Invasion of the Body Snatchers . In this movie the citizens of a small American city are secretly 
replaced gradually by alien replicas grown from pods that have fallen from outer space. When 
placed near a sleeping human body, the pods assume control by appropriating memory, 
personality characteristics, and a perfect physi- 
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cal resemblance; all they lack is human emotions. As the pod creature blooms in the night, the 
human creature withers, so that the next morning—presto!—a real vegetable substitute walks 
and talks in embodied form and the "system of symbols and meanings" is virtually unchanged: 
people still drink coffee and read the newspapers in the modern manner criticized by Camus, 
though fornication has become obsolete. But of course there is one major change in the culture of 
this town, for the system of symbols and meanings has taken on a distinctly alien life of its own, 
and the one passion left to the quasi-carnivorous vegetarians—if I may so describe creatures who 
absorb human flesh while remaining vegetables—is to transform all human life to their system of 
perfect, dispassionate being, to their rational system of symbols and meanings. 
Now many valid interpretations of The Invasion of the Body Snatchers can be given. It could 
signify the paranoia of the McCarthy era in the 1950s. Or, in its remade version from the 1980s, 
it might signify the neo-1950s paranoia of the neo-McCarthyite neoconservatives. It could also 
be taken to signify the deadliness of "organization man," as a sort of collective synonym for 
Willy Loman of Arthur Miller's Death of a Salesman . We could also interpret this movie as a 
prophecy of the evisceration of the American city by the "alien" automobile and shopping mall, a 
process that began in earnest in the 1950s and continues unabated today, leaving in its wake 
"urbanoid tissue." For my purposes the movie is a popular narrative of mythic rationality: the 
progressive loss of natural human capacities resulting from the dictatorship of the megamachine 
of modernity. The cultural processes that effuse from the movie in phobic form are expressed in 
recent culture theories in intellectual form. 
Culture theory, in its dominant contemporary manifestations, is to my poor ape eyes an old 
science fiction movie, practiced by would-be body snatchers: some claim to transform the body 
into a text or into communicative "talking heads"; still others seek to appropriate the human 
capacity to body forth meaning to the depersonalized system, for example, Niklas Luhmann's 
concept of autopoeisis . A considerable number of feminists have as their goal, not the reform of 
gender relations, but the eradication of gender: they take a neutered androgeny as an ideal instead 
of as a form of deprivation. Camus regretted modern man, reduced to a life of coffee drinking, 
newspaper reading, and fornicating. What would he say of our genderless, eviscerated, 
postmodern person, reduced to the status of a text? At least Camus's modern man could have a 
little coffee and sex now and then. Whether one regards gender as 
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limited to conventional social roles or, as I believe, an aspect of one's identity with deep 
biosemiotic roots in the human body, femininity and masculinity ought to be celebrated as part of 
what it means to be human. The attempt to eradicate gender differences is based on the mistaken 
assumption that genderlessness is requisite for social equality. Those who would devalue gender 
are unwitting accomplices of the invisible dictator of modernity, the neutered ghost in the 
machine. 
The body has recently emerged as a major theme in intellectual life, but it is for the most part a 
conceptualized and etherealized body modeled on the text: the gospel of postmodernism seems 
to proclaim that "the flesh was made word and dwells among us!" In other words, it is not so 
much "body language" that is now fashionable as the body as language. The rhetoric of the body, 
the conventionalization of the body, and the symbolism of gender differences can all be 
significant topics. But when we note how little is said about the organic, biological body in these 
discussions, we begin to suspect that the academic megamachine is continuing its work of 
rational etherealization. Such is perhaps more clearly the case in Paul Ricouer's and Jacques 
Derrida's calls to view human action and social life as texts or in Jürgen Habermas's theory of 
communicative action, which says much about rational talkers talking, but very little about actors 
acting: felt, perceptive, imaginative, bodily experience does not fit these theories (Rochberg-
Halton 1989b). 
Or consider the systems theorist Niklas Luhmann, who introduced the idea of autopoeisis to 
account for self-generating systems. Here we see another contemporary avatar of the 
megamachine. The abstract, lifeless "systems" theory, because it excludes the living humans who 
comprise the social "system" as significant, ignores those natural capacities of life for self-
making and self-generation. Autopoeisis must ignore poeisis , the human ability to create 
meaning in uniquely realized acts and works that transcend mere system per se. Therefore 
Luhmann's theory can be seen as part of the age-old dream to give life to the machine, in this 
case the machinelike system. His concept of autopoeisis is like the robot, android, or other 
automation fetishes of contemporary popular culture and movies, many of which involve (and 
even celebrate) a transformation of humans into automatons. Such sociological theories are not 
too distant from materialist artificial intelligence and "neural network" theories, which view 
human beings, to quote computer scientist Marvin Minsky, as highly systematic "meat 
machines." I take these intellectual and cultural phenomena as further signs of the capitulation of 
autonomous life to the automaton. 
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Hence the current interest in the body may have the further undoing of the body as its 
unacknowledged goal. Whether disembodied as conceptualism or reified as mechanistic system, 
we are still left with the ghost in the machine. 
Contemporary culture theory is, for the most part, a form of sensory deprivation. Those who 
proclaim culture to be a "system of symbols and meanings" make an uncritical assumption that 
culture, symbols, and meanings neither touch nor are deeply touched by organic life. Indeed the 
ideologues of culture theory tend to regard any concern with the relations between culture and 
organic nature or evolution as a threat to the hegemony of the cultural system over meaning. 
There are significant exceptions to this outlook, notably in the work of Clifford Geertz, Victor 
Turner, and Lewis Mumford (Rochberg-Halton 1989c, 1990). Geertz has written on the 
interaction of culture and biology in the emergence of human culture. As he says in his essay 
"The Growth of Culture and the Evolution of Mind": "Man's nervous system does not merely 
enable him to acquire culture, it positively demands that he do so if it is going to function at all. 
Rather than culture acting only to supplement, develop, and extend organically based capacities 
logically and genetically prior to it, it would seem to be ingredient to those capacities 
themselves. A cultureless human being would probably turn out to be not an intrinsically talented 
though unfulfilled ape, but a wholly mindless and consequently unworkable monstrosity" 
(1973:68). By implication one can also say that a natureless human being could not be 
considered "civilized," but a similarly unworkable monstrosity. 
As the neurological disorder of autism reveals, it is possible to perform and remember 
complicated human tasks that are yet devoid of meaning. As cases of individuals who have 
suffered damage to the hippocampus reveal, it is possible to retain the heights of human 
consciousness, speech, and passion while trapped in a continual present, utterly devoid of the 
ability to remember anything since the time of the damage, to encode new information, or to 
project a course of action beyond the immediate situation. This misfortune tragically gives the lie 
to the avant-garde dream of erasing the past to achieve a "live" present: such a culture would 
truly be posthuman in the sense of being deprived of the means of human experience. Clearly 
human biology, as seen in the human brain and its meaning and memory capacities or in the 
vocal organs, is involved in a reciprocal relationship with culture. 
Culture may be an objectified organ of meaning, but it remains 
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potentially connected to the organic proclivities and limitations of human bodies through the 
tempering effects of experience. The plasticity of culture does not signify the poverty of 
underlying human instincts, as Arnold Gehlen thought, but the positive plasticity or vagueness of 
human instincts: culture does not free us (or deprive us) of biology but has coevolved as an 
intrinsic aspect of human biology. 
To anyone who seriously considers how human culture came to be, Geertz's statement that 
culture is ingredient to organically based capacities challenges the so-called nature-culture 
dichotomy. Ironically though, Geertz's ideas on the interaction of culture and biology are rarely 
cited, whereas his more conceptualistic "cultural system" works are cited. Though Geertz is 
generally appreciative of the significance of organic human nature for culture, even he retains the 
reductionistic tendencies of the "cultural systematizers" to view meaning as limited to the mode 
of conventional signification. 
Conventionalism, the view that all human meaning is based upon non-natural social conventions, 
holds a pervasive sway over contemporary life. The leading French schools of thought associated 
with structuralism and poststructuralism retain strong influences of Ferdinand de Saussure's 
conventionalist semiology, and even Pierre Bourdieu's attempt to develop a more experiential 
category of the habitus remains thoroughly conventionalist, viewing the habitus as a "system of 
dispositions." 
This view is particularly clear in Bourdieu's discussions of aesthetic judgment in his book 
Distinction, in which he assumes the standard dichotomy between "essentialist" and 
conventionalist analysis and claims that essentialist analysis "must fail" because it ignores the 
fact that all intentions and judgments are products of social conventions. The term essentialism 
carries with it highly negative meanings in cultural studies today, and Bourdieu's criticism of 
essentialism represents the tendency to regard aesthetic qualities—the essential—as nonsocial. 
The producer's intention 
is itself the product of the social norms and conventions which combine to define the always 
uncertain and historically changing frontier between simple technical objects and objects 
d'art. . . . But the apprehension and appreciation of the work also depend on the beholder's 
intention, which is itself a function of the conventional norms governing the relation to the work 
of art in a certain historical and social situation and also of the beholder's capacity to conform to 
those norms, i.e., his artistic training. To break out of this circle one only has to observe that the 
ideal of "pure" perception of a work of art qua work of art is 
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the product of the enunciation and systematization of the principles of specifically aesthetic 
legitimacy which accompany the constituting of a relatively autonomous artistic field. The 
aesthetic mode of perception in the "pure" form which it has now assumed corresponds to a 
particular state of the mode of artistic production (Bourdieu 1984:29–30). 
By claiming that all aesthetic experience is purely conventional and therefore social, Bourdieu is 
attacking the view that aesthetic judgment consists in an unmediated act of perception and that 
the work of art possesses inherent qualities unmediated by social signification. In the 
conventional view that Bourdieu takes, to be human is to be the enclosed product of those 
specific social norms in which one finds oneself. It is the same old world in which the social is 
limited to the conventional and modalities of nonconventional signification, such as iconic and 
indexical signs, are thereby falsely assumed to be nonsocial. It is a world in which the human 
creature, who, above all others both is open to meaning and needs meaning, is denied the social 
capacity to body forth genuinely new meaning not reducible to, though growing out of, prior 
social norms. Another route, which Bourdieu's conventionalism forbids him to take, is to view 
aesthetic experience as fully social, yet not necessarily conventional, so that conventions 
themselves are live processes of sign interpretation open to experience, growth, and cultivation 
or "minding." In such a view every sign can possess its own qualitative significance or essence 
qua communicative sign, as well as reflect social structures. Hence, from my perspective, 
aesthetic experience may be truly formative in giving birth to new "social norms." The ability to 
body forth new meaning, not reducible to prior conventions, has the added advantage of being 
able to explain how conventions developed in the first place, a question that conventionalism 
usually avoids. 
Anthony Giddens and Jürgen Habermas have sought to reconstruct the basis of social theory, but 
both remain stalwarts of unreconstructed conventionalism at the heart of their theories of 
meaning. Giddens has sought to broaden the base of contemporary theory by using a French 
structuralist conception of structure and linking it with a theory of "agency" influenced by 
language analysis, ethnomethodology, and symbolic interactionism. His "structuration theory" 
can be seen as an attempt to deal with the old sociological problem (itself part of the older 
nominalist problem) of the relation of the individual with society, or "action" with "order," or 
subject with object. Yet even a reconstructed structuralism remains too narrow to encompass 
structure; while agency, even in a broad sense, remains too narrow to encompass subjectivity, 
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and both are inadequate for the creation of a broader theory of meaning. French structuralism 
reifies structure, treating it as a deep code of "logical" differences divorced from human 
practices, habits, and memory. "Agency" does not go deeply enough into the personal or 
individual side of meaning, which includes the being acted upon or suffering of experience, the 
"patient" side of the agent-patient dialectic, let alone the inner dimensions of experience that do 
not fall under the rubric of agency. 
Richard Rorty, who would seem to take a very different perspective, mistakenly called 
neopragmatism, remains within the conventionalist fold he seems to reject, viewing meaning as 
limited to arbitrary language games. Unlike the pragmatists, he denies that there are qualitative 
and existential modalities of signification not reducible to conventional signs alone (Rochberg-
Halton 1992). Surely human languages involve conventions, but the full range of meaning or 
human communication—not to mention human social life—is simply not exhausted by 
conventional signification. As the neurologist Oliver Sacks put it: 
Speech—natural speech—does not consist of words alone, nor . . . "propositions" alone. It 
consists of utterance —an uttering-forth of one's whole meaning with one's whole being—the 
understanding of which involves infinitely more than mere word-recognition. . . . For though the 
words, the verbal constructions per se, might convey nothing [to aphasics], spoken language is 
normally suffused with "tone," embedded in an expressiveness which transcends the verbal—and 
it is precisely this expressiveness, so deep, so various, so complex, so subtle, which is perfectly 
preserved in aphasia, though understanding is destroyed (Sacks 1987:81). 
Given the undeniable facts of communication practices in humans and other species in which 
signification occurs through nonconventional modalities, why then does conventionalism hold 
such a power over the contemporary mind? 
One way to answer this question is to view these theories as emanating from cultural 
nominalism, a term I use to characterize the modern epoch. Cultural nominalism denotes 
modernity as a culture rooted in the dichotomous principles of philosophical nominalism. I do 
not suggest that modernity was caused by nominalism, but that the philosophy that arose in 
opposition to scholastic realism was itself a symptom of the shift of epochs, one that put into 
philosophical form the underlying antipathies of the emergent ethos. Yet it should also not be 
forgotten that philosophy and theology had significant influences on the development of Western 
civilization in the Middle Ages. 
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Max Weber's patently false idea that modern capitalism should be viewed as a sixteenth-century 
product of the Protestant ethos ignores the clear emergence of capitalism out of medieval 
Catholic culture and the rising nominalism that gave birth to Protestant theology. Early 
nominalists, following the via moderna of William of Ockham, claimed that reality could be 
found only in knowledge of particulars, that general laws are fictions or conventions, and that 
conventions are simply names for particulars, hence nominal. Nominalism in effect created two 
worlds by driving a wedge between thought and things and then faced the problem of how to put 
them together, the problem of modern philosophy. What the scholastics might have accepted on 
faith or revelation becomes increasingly inexplicable in the nominalist ethos. Descartes, for 
example, assumed a dichotomy between thinking substance and extended substance, the ghost in 
the machine, and faced the problem of how we can have valid knowledge of objects if the only 
basis for knowledge is intuitive individual self-consciousness. 
What is interesting about the nominalistic ethos is how it systematically undercuts cultus —the 
spontaneous impulse to meaning. The whole ideal of systematic, rational science modeled on the 
mechanical conception of the universe that one sees in Descartes and Hobbes, who both believed 
that life, as Hobbes put it, "is but a motion of Limbs," grows directly out of the spirit of 
nominalism. By the time of Calvin, who was educated in nominalist theology, "the impulse to 
meaning" becomes an intolerable threat to the great clockwork system of predestination and 
rational self-control. Hobbes, who also was taught nominalist theology, transformed the impulse 
to meaning into a mythic projection of individual competitive lust and aggression in the state of 
nature, which had to be repressed by a social contract—a non-natural artifice or convention. 
Bentham psychologized and nominalized it yet further into individual sensations of pleasure and 
pain. Even Freud, who is instrumental in the return of the cultic in twentieth-century culture, 
based his metapsychology in a Bentham-like underlying "pleasure principle" of the reflex-arc 
concept. 
One cannot deny that much of meaning is conventional, though conventions themselves, it seems 
to me, are inherently purposive and subject to cultivation. Conventionalism is proposed as an 
antidote to reductionism, yet it radically reduces the realm of significance, meaning, and the 
social. That which is outside the system is regarded as meaningless until it is "systematized." The 
conventional view says that conventions or codes encompass culture. Hence a number of recent 
sociologi- 
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cal studies take the position that art can be understood solely as social conventions, thereby 
denying aesthetic quality (Wolff 1981; Becker 1982; Bürger 1984; Griswold 1987). Similarly, 
attempts to discuss either the brute factuality or the esthetic or inherent meanings involved in 
human experience are frequently dismissed by cultural theorists as reductionistic or obsolete 
because these approaches fail to see that all meaning is conventional, that is, dependent on 
cultural belief systems or conventions. Hence the expressive outpouring of an artist is 
meaningful only insofar as it can be related to existing cultural values, beliefs, and constructions. 
The inner compelling expressiveness of a work of art is reduced to outer considerations. 
One can view a late work by the sculptor Ivan Mestrovic[*] , An Old Father in Despair at the 
Death of His Son (figure 2.1), and, knowing that Mestrovic's own son committed suicide, see the 
autobiographical source for the agonized figure. Clearly representational conventions are 
involved in the form of this sculpture. But one is still left finally with the sculpture itself, the 
powerful father's hands covering most of the face in grief. To say that the sculpture 
communicates the system of artistic representation or that it is an "aesthetic-practical" form of 
communication (Habermas) is to miss the point that this physical thing is a bodying forth of 
human feeling through the hands that shaped it, directly conveying the feeling of human grief 
through the hands covering the agonized face. It is not a "symbol" standing for something else; it 
is a living icon and secretion of human experience. It may involve conventions, but these are the 
vessel, the husk, that contains that actualized experience. 
Most sociologies of art and culture do not consider that a work of art might be a spontaneous, 
meaning-generating gesture or sign not reducible to the conventions from which it grew. The 
organic, the inherent qualitative possibilities, the imaginative, the spontaneous, the contingent, 
the serendipitous—in short, the extrarational and nonsystematic—must be devalued or 
disregarded by the practitioners of conceptual system . The result is a systematic ethereal grid 
that treats only the externals of culture while denying its vital, extrarational, incarnate sources. 
Culture as abstract, depersonalized system denies the living source of culture as cultus . In its 
reliance on culture as system, it raises system from a means of interpretation to a virtual end of 
cultural life. Hence culture theory itself is by and large part of a progressive externalization of 
meaning in cultural life generally: meaning as technique, meaning as prepackaged script, 
meaning as "the honor of the name." 
 




Ivan Mestrovic[*] ,  An Old Father in Despair at the Death of  
His Son,  1961. Snite Museum of Art, University of Notre Dame. 
The Culture and Manurance of Minds 
When Francis Bacon in 1605 wrote of "the culture and manurance of minds," the literal sense of 
culture as tending and cultivating nature was still very much in the foreground, although the 
metaphoric extension of the term to mind was intended. The term culture traces back to the Latin 
colere, which meant variously to till, cultivate, dwell or inhabit, and which in turn traces back to 
the Indo-European 
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root, *Kwel- , which meant to turn round a place, to wheel, to furrow. As Raymond Williams 
noted: 
Some of these meanings eventually separated, though still with occasional over-lapping, in the 
derived nouns. Thus "inhabit" developed through colonus , Latin to colony . "Honour with 
worship" developed through cultus , Latin to cult. Cultura took on the main meaning of 
cultivation or tending, though with subsidiary medieval meanings of honour and worship. . . . 
Culture in all its early uses was a noun of process: the tending of something, basically crops or 
animals. . . . At various points in this development two crucial changes occurred: first, a degree 
of habituation to the metaphor, which made the sense of human tending direct; second, an 
extension of particular processes to a general process, which the word could abstractly carry 
(Williams 1976:77). 
The term culture , according to Williams, was not significant as an independent noun before the 
eighteenth century and was not common before the nineteenth century. But even before the 
nineteenth century the term was already beset by the etherealizing tendencies of ethnocentric 
universalism, so that Johann Herder could state that "nothing is more indeterminate than this 
word, and nothing more deceptive than its application to all nations and periods." Colonize and 
culture are both derived from the same root, and Herder was well aware of how the 
Enlightenment dream of "universal reason" could also be used as an expression of European 
power. He complained of the treatment of human histories and diversities as mere manurance for 
European culture: "Men of all the quarters of the globe, who have perished over the ages, you 
have not lived solely to manure the earth with your ashes, so that at the end of time your 
posterity should be made happy by European culture. The very thought of a superior European 
culture is a blatant insult to the majesty of Nature" (1784–1791, cited in Williams 1976:79). 
Cultural anthropology has in many ways taken Herder's words to heart, admitting—to use the 
title from one of Clifford Geertz's books—"the interpretation of cultures" in the plural as its 
central task. Yet in the long history and vicissitudes of the term culture , there has remained a 
broader sense of culture as meaning in general, which remains a central problematic of social 
theory even if it has lost its earthy origins. Cosmopolitans do not like the smell of Bacon's 
conception of "the culture and manurance of minds," preferring the intellectualistic "systems of 
symbols and meanings." Please do not misunderstand me, honored colleagues of the academy. I 
am not simply calling for an anti-intellectual, nostalgic return to farmer's wisdom, such as 
expressed in the following 
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quotient: Die Quantität der Potate ist indirekt proportional zur Intelligenskapazität ihres 
Kultivators! (Or, as they say in the south, Der Dümmste Bauer hat die grösste' Kartoffel!).[*] I am 
simply saying that we must revitalize the concept of culture and free it from the abstractionist 
grip of our time: we must put the cult back in culture . 
We have come a long way from the earthy conception of culture as a living process of furrowing 
and cultivating nature within and without, of the organic admixture of growth and decay that 
such a conception implies, of the springing forth of tendrils of belief needing active cultivation 
for survival. One of the glaring holes in most contemporary conceptions of culture is the lack of 
attention to the birth of meanings, a lack that applies equally to the term conception . In 
intellectual discourse, conception connotes, almost without exception, rational beliefs and not the 
gestation of something new, the birth of meaning. Likewise, culture now connotes systematized 
meaning for most culture theorists and has lost the fertile, seminal, and gestational meanings it 
once carried: "the culture and manurance of minds." Both the living source and the final aim of 
culture, I claim, is cultus . Yet it is precisely the cultic that is so frequently occulted by 
contemporary culture theory. 
The word cult , despite its obvious relation to culture, seems worlds apart from its meaning in 
everyday language. Cults are usually associated with pathologically disturbed or ideologically 
brainwashed groups—satanists, the suicidal followers of Jim Jones at Jonestown, Moonies, and 
the lunatic fringe in general—but the term also applies to emerging religious sects, such as the 
early Christian cults. In the anthropological sense the word cult is strongly associated with ritual, 
as in the "cargo cults" that appeared in the South Pacific after World War II or the various rituals 
to Afro-Christian "saints" in the Umbanda cults of Brazil. The ethnographic record, Freud, and 
Durkheim have sensitized us to how certain objects become endowed with sacred or obsessional 
significance as fetishes—such as a wooden sculpture of a human form studded with nails by the 
Bakongo people of West Africa (figure 2.2). We see in these examples how deep human needs 
and desires seek objectified, and often fantastic or perverse, form. 
One of the most insightful accounts of the cultic roots of culture is to be found in the work of 
Victor Turner. His masterful ethnography reveals the fundamental reality of the subjunctive 
mood in human affairs: the 
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ritual process. In Turner's analyses of the Isoma and Wubwang'u rituals of the Ndembu of 
northwestern Zambia, one sees the fantastic interplay between human affliction and symbolic 
renewal, between human communities and a natural environment teeming with signification. The 
Ndembu are revealed to be a people with a deep appreciation of the complexity of existence and 
endowed with a sophisticated technics of meaning, a vast architectonic of felt, expressive forms 
through which they journey to those borderlands beyond human comprehensibility: death, the 
dead, the call of the mother-line, fecundity, transformation, the interstices of social structure. 
Systematizers who seek an airtight scheme with absolute closure will not find it in Turner's 
work. His theories are open-ended, ever acknowledging the greater richness and potentiality and 
not-yet-decipherable and perhaps not systematizable richness inherent in experience and culture. 
He continually directs our gaze instead to those social "openings" through which the ferment of 
culture erupts. Cultures are not simply inert structures or bloodless "systems," but form a 
"processual" dialectic between structure and liminality. 
In his well-known essay, "Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites of Passage" 
(1967:93–111), Turner attempted to grasp that virtually ungraspable mercurial element in human 
affairs in which normal social structure and mores of conduct are temporarily eclipsed. 
Liminality was that which dismembered structure in order to transform, renew, and re-member it. 
Turner went on to show, in this essay and in other works, how liminality provides a time of 
visceral or meditative (or both together) reflection, a time of reflective speculation: "Liminality 
here breaks, as it were, the cake of custom and enfranchises speculation. . . . Liminality is the 
realm of primitive hypothesis, where there is a certain freedom to juggle with the factors of 
existence. As in the works of Rabelais, there is a promiscuous intermingling and juxtaposing of 
the categories of event, experience, and knowledge, with a pedagogic intention" (1967:106). 
Turner notes, however, that the liberty of liminality is ritually limited in tribal societies and must 
give way to traditional custom and law. 
In Turner's works, one continually confronts the drama and mystery of life itself in its humanly 
perceivable forms. The live human creture, not the dead abstract system, is the source of what he 
termed processual anthropology . Throughout The Ritual Process , he engages Claude Lévi-
Strauss in a dialectical contrast, posing his processual anthropology against Lévi-Strauss's 
structuralism, while yet drawing from Lévi-Strauss's analyses that which he finds useful. In 
Turner, one sees that 
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meaning is much more than a "logical structure," because it involves powerful emotions not 
reducible to logic, a purposiveness not reducible to binary oppositions, "a material integument 
shaped by . . . life experience." In short, a processual approach views structure as a slow process, 
sometimes very slow indeed. Or as Turner puts it, "Structure is always ancillary to, dependent 
on, secreted from process" (1985:190). 
Turner is very much concerned with systemic or structural questions, but he continually reminds 
us of the human face behind the social roles, status hierarchies, and social structures. That human 
face may be painted with the red and white clays of Wubwang'u , or it may be adorned with the 
phantasms of carnival, or it may be soberly dressed in ritual poverty, but Turner's theories, and 
the body of his work itself, never let us forget those deep human needs for fantastic symboling to 
express the fullness of being. 
Central to Turner's processual anthropology and comparative symbology is the ritual symbol, 
which he considered the "core" unit of analysis. The symbol is the "blaze"—the mark or path—
that directs us from the unknown to the known, both in the Ndembu sense of kujikijila (to blaze a 
trail by cutting marks or breaking or bending branches on trees) and in C. G. Jung's sense. Key to 
the indigenous hermeneutic of the Ndembu is the term ku-solola —"to make visible," or "to 
reveal"—which is the chief aim of Ndembu ritual, just as its equivalent concept of aletheia is for 
Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutic. These Ndembu terms derive from the vocabulary of 
hunting cults and reveal their high ritual value. The idea of making a blaze or path through the 
forest also draws attention to the significance of trees for the Ndembu, not only as providing the 
texture of the physical environment, but also as sources of spiritual power. The associations of 
substances derived from trees with properties of blood and milk, or of toughness with health and 
fruitfulness with fertility, which Turner discusses in his description of the Isoma ritual, also 
reveal why he chose Baudelaire's phrase "the forest of symbols," as the title for one of his books. 
In his ground-breaking discussions of color symbolism in Ndembu ritual, Turner shows how the 
social system of classification comes into play, but he roots the social meanings of red, white, 
and black symbols to the experiential level of bodily fluids and substances of blood, milk and 
sperm, and feces. 
At the time of his death Turner was fully engaged in the struggle to achieve a new synthesis—a 
theoretical rite of passage to a broadened vision of anthropology and social theory. A number of 
social theorists 
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have been claiming to be transforming social theory—I am thinking here of Habermas, 
Luhmann, Giddens, and others—but for the most part they have been replaying tired variations 
on old themes without ever questioning the premises of modern social theory. But in Turner's 
synthesis of social dramas, liminality, communitas, Deweyan and Diltheyan understandings of 
"experience," and neurobiological semiotics, perhaps we see the unexpected outline of a new 
understanding of the human creature: one which reconnects biological life and meaning, which 
embraces the "subjunctive" as no less fundamental a reality of human existence than the 
"indicative," which views the realm of the fantastic as a precious resource for continued human 
development rather than as a vestige of an archaic and obsolete past. 
Turner is regarded as an anthropologist in the Anglo-American sense, but his late work, like that 
of Lewis Mumford, reveals him to be a philosophical anthropologist in the German sense as 
well. Turner and Mumford are no throwbacks to biological reductionism. Quite the contrary: 
both are master interpreters of meaning, both are original contributors to the semiotic turn of the 
social sciences, both are exponents of a dramaturgical understanding of human action. Yet both 
felt compelled, in the name of human meaning , to delve into the biological sources of 
signification. The liminal processes revealed in lucid detail by Turner and the broad historical 
account of human development and sociocultural transformation given by Mumford complement 
each other and illustrate how both authors share a deep appreciation of the cultic roots of culture. 
Their work shows the way toward undoing the etherealizing spectre that haunts the 
contemporary study of meaning and culture as well as its mechanico-materialist opposite in 
human ethology and sociobiology. At the heart of Turner's and Mumford's work is ever the 
incandescent human form. 
To those who can no longer live within the frame of mythic rationality and its cultural 
nominalism, the artificial split between a mechanical nature devoid of generality and a culture 
reduced to human conventions devoid of tempered experience and organic roots seems a quaint 
relic from the bifurcated world of cultural nominalism, mythic modernity. This peculiar mindset 
took the rationalization of culture, the technicalization of society, and the mechanization of the 
universe to be a troubling, yet logical, development in occidental culture: Disenchantment is the 
name and cost of freedom. 
Is rationalization ultimately the proper term for Weber's project? Or does rational maximization 
better capture the processes that Weber 
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thought he saw inherent in religion and in the peculiar developments of the Occident? 
Rationalization ought to describe the normal growth and context of rationality in human life, the 
place of rational capacities as organs of a mind deeper and broader than rationality alone. The 
human mind, in both its individual and collective manifestations, reveals the extrarational 
capacities of memory and invention, interpretative "sensing" and organic balancing, rich 
emotional communication—not at all limited to what words alone can say—and an obsessive 
need for the semblance of meaning. 
The fullness of the human body also reveals dark, destructive impulses potentially active in all of 
the human capacities, impulses generated no doubt from our own animal depths but by no means 
excluded from our rational heights: for every Caliban there is also one of Kafka's devitalized 
rational apes. The rationalist too frequently places the blame for human evil and folly on the 
irrational, ignoring the great tendencies of decontextualized rationality toward self-destruction. 
"The devil made me do it" alibi only works when one fully acknowledges the ever-present devil 
within: criticism must always invoke self-criticism. There is in pure rationality a profound 
aptitude for cold-blooded murderousness and its seeming opposite: Weltschmaltz, the self-
beautifying lie of sentimentalism. Albert Speer said that Hitler in his more manic moods and 
rages would discuss plans he did not necessarily mean to carry out. But when he was calm, cool, 
and collected—"rational"—his inner circle knew he fully intended to carry out his calculations, 
no matter how extreme. In Speer's account one sees what is perhaps the twentieth century's most 
notable "achievement": rational madness. 
Though mythic rationality saw the many distortions that entered into modern life through 
capitalism, rationalism, technicalism, and individualism, it never questioned whether the 
mechanization of nature in the seventeenth century might also be part of this distorting process. 
Because virtually all of social theory has grown out of the same processes of cultural 
nominalism, theorists tend to accept uncritically the reified split between thought and things, 
between culture and nature. Culture can then be assumed to be free from nature or to seek as its 
goal to escape from nature through the perfection of rationality. In both cases the underlying task 
is to etherealize the human creature, to divest it of its organic, cultic, biosemiotic roots. Yet all 
the inner autonomous forms of culture, all the outer technical codes and know-how, and all the 
rational justifications for progressive, modernized, "communicative" 
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culture remain insufficient for a truly vital culture when disconnected from the tissues of life, 
from human bodies and their social relations. 
The cultic is the springing forth of the impulse to meaning, which culminates in belief. As such 
the cultic is no throwback to "vitalism" but involves the deepest emotional, preconscious, and 
even instinctive capacities of the human body for semiosis. Although most theories of culture 
tend to view meaning as conventional knowledge or system, I am proposing that the essence of 
meaning resides in bodies sign-practices that circumscribe mere knowledge. Conventions of 
language, gesture, image, and artifact should be viewed as the means toward incarnate sign-
practices, not as the structural or systemic foundations or ends of meaning. The very attempts to 
ground meaning in a theory of pure conventionalism are signs of the evisceration of meaning, the 
hollowing out of living human experience to the external technique or the idolatry of the "code." 
By "incarnate sign-practices" I mean that culture is a process of semiosis, or sign-action, 
intrinsically involving the capacities of the human body for memory, communication, and 
imaginative projection, and is not completely separable from those capacities. Social structure, in 
this perspective, cannot be severed from the living inferential metaboly of human experience 
through systematic or structuralist abstraction, but it needs to be conceived in some relation to 
lived human experience and its requirements, limitations, and possibilities. Human life, in its 
organic fullness, remains the yardstick for social theory and cultural meaning, and neither the 
abstractionist distortions and perversions of the life-concept through biological reductionism nor 
the equally abstractionist repression of the life-concept through cultural reductionism will suffice 
any longer. 
Dreams As Organs of Meaning 
Let us turn to the social fact of dreaming, a nightly experience shared by all human beings, as an 
unexpected way to explore the cultic roots of culture. To most social theorists, dreams emanate 
from a twilight zone of questionable value: dreams are "imaginary" and therefore unimportant 
aspects of modern life. The task of modern social theory, after all, is to wake humanity from its 
dream and bring it to self-consciousness. Yet dreams, I claim, cannot be wished away from our 
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evolutionary past, from our sociocultural present, or from our potential futures. There is good 
reason to suspect that dreaming was a significant component of the experiential world of the 
protohumans: the fantastic image-making process, autonomously produced by the psyche, a 
private, though social, self-dialogue of the organism, its "language" fashioned from the forms of 
experience. Dreaming may very well have helped to "image" us into humanity. And we may yet 
remain creatures of the dream. 
Sociologists might take the view that dreaming is nonsocial and therefore unsuitable for 
sociological analysis, except perhaps as dreams are somehow recorded and become social 
"texts." This sociological view remains insufficiently social, however, in not acknowledging how 
actual dreaming itself, like speaking, is both a social trait of all humans and consists of 
narrativelike structures and a "language" of images incorporated from cultural experience. 
Whereas speech communicates publicly shared meanings, dreams can incorporate private 
meanings that transcend local culture. For this reason it is important to view dreams as private, 
yet thoroughly social, experiences. Dreams are self-communications, feelings that have already 
been elaborated into communicative, imagistic signs. Dreams may be indicators not only of 
individual development but also of formative experiences in the inner growth of the person and 
the origins of human symbolic activity. 
In attempting to fathom the vanished past from visible remains, we tend to ignore the most 
perfect archaeological artifact of human evolution: the living human body. Although 
archaeologists have become quite sophisticated in using medical and physical evidence from 
ancient corpses, they have not been as willing to use the living human body today as evidence for 
prior likely evolutionary developments. Yet archaeoneurology remains an area of potentially 
great significance, not only for an understanding of how humans became human, but also for 
understanding contemporary human nature and signification. 
Though I am not familiar with earlier uses of the term archaeoneurology, the idea was familiar 
to Sigmund Freud, the neurologist and archaeologist of the psyche and amateur archaeologist of 
ancient civilizations. If anti-Semitism had not barred Freud from an academic career, he might 
have become a noted archaeologist instead of the founder of psychoanalysis. Yet Freud's 
investigations of the unconscious show that he remained a psychic archaeologist, attempting to 
show how the dreams of his turn-of-the-century patients revealed both a personal history and a 
biological drama as old as the human race. In The Interpreta- 
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tion of Dreams, Freud uses a stratigraphic method of symbol interpretation in which the contents 
of dreams are shown to reveal underlying sexual and familial themes, such as the Oedipal myth, 
and these themes are ultimately rooted in Freud's nineteenth-century neurological understanding 
of the reflex-arc concept. The layers of the unconscious are like the layers of time embedded in 
an archaeological site: each level a farther step into the past, until one arrives at the mechanical 
model of the reflex arc as explanation. 
Freud's archaeoneurology is a curious blend of literary interpretation and scientistic mechanism. 
Freud posits a divided psyche, which is a classic example of cultural nominalism: there is the 
subject whose question is "How do I know?" and the object whose question is "How does it 
work?" The first Freud called das Ich, the I or ego, the second he called das Es, the it or id. The 
id is the realm of mechanical force, the ego is the realm of symbolic purpose. One might also 
read the id as Thomas Hobbes's "state of nature" and the ego as a kind of "social contract." 
Symbolic representation is achieved through the successful resolution of the Oedipal conflict, in 
which the metaphoric Oedipus in us all comes to harness the inner "natural" urges to murder and 
to commit incest by identifying symbolically with the same sex parent and thereby "having" or 
relating symbolically, rather than genitally, to the opposite sex parent. One establishes an inner 
triadic, psychic family representation, which serves to mediate the subject to the object, the 
unconscious. 
One of Freud's positive achievements was to show the power of the human family in the psyche. 
Just as Feuerbach had unmasked the "holy family" as standing for the earthly family and Marx 
had unmasked the earthly family to reveal the bourgeois family, Freud attempted to show that the 
earthly family was itself a surface manifestation of deeper and darker forces of the unconscious. 
Yet his choice of the Oedipus myth and his own myth of a "primal horde," which had 
collectively killed the primal father and then banded together to form a social contract against 
further killings, have come to look much more, with the passage of time and the accumulation of 
archaeological evidence, like the fin-de-siècle fictions they were, when all of Europe, and Vienna 
in particular, banded together to kill off the past. Freud's "primal horde," perhaps more than his 
other images, reveals the workings of a mythic nominalism, of a world of convention banded 
together for its own protection and set utterly apart from its own ground of development: 
competitive struggle for individual survival is natural, relationship or mutual aid is not and must 
therefore be invented. 
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One sees in Freud's psychoanalytic theories the deep imprint of Hobbes and other English 
thinkers admired by Freud, such as John Stuart Mill, transposed to the "innerness" of 
German/Austrian thought. Freud helped to open up the floodgates of the unconscious in the face 
of twentieth-century rationalism, yet his view of the workings of the psyche is itself another 
manifestation of that rationalism: it is tethered to an outmoded mechanical model of biology and 
to a conception of human communities and communication as epiphenomenal aspects of 
consciousness, superimposed on the underlying reality of the id. 
Freud's junior colleague, C. G. Jung, broke with him because of Freud's rationalism. Jung 
increasingly appreciated the purposeful role of nonrational symbols and the limited place of 
rationality in the purposeful activities of the psyche. One might say that whereas Freud's 
unconscious becomes darker the farther one penetrates into the unconscious, Jung's unconscious 
becomes increasingly luminous, perhaps too much so. One moves from the darkness of the 
personal unconscious to the archetypal figures of the collective unconscious. Jung believed that 
the deepest processes of the unconscious were collective, purposive symbols: literally 
personalities. The images of the trickster and the hero were not solely the products of legends 
and myths, but were realities embodied within the psyche. These personalities were related 
through narrative inner transformations that could be observed in dreams, in artistic activities, 
and, Jung believed, in the symbolism of myths and religions. 
In many ways Jung comes closer to the idea of archaeoneurology, but he remained, as did Freud, 
bound by an overly inner view of the human psyche and too ready to deprive experience of its 
own formative influence in the generation and meaning of symbols. Freud and Jung opened new 
dimensions for the human sciences, but their theories give short shrift to the thoroughly social 
nature of dreaming and psychic life in general. Freud's metapsychological foundations are rooted 
in the nominalistic individualism of Hobbes, with symbolic consciousness the inner psychic 
equivalent of Hobbes's social contract, erected over the "Warre of Each against all" of the state 
of nature, or, in Freud's term, the id. Jung's concept of the archetypal unconscious is more social 
than Freud's, but it still is based on a Kantian-like structuralism that does not explain how 
archetypal structures came about or how human experience and culture may transcend archetypal 
imperatives both individually and institutionally. Sociologists may see in Durkheim's theory of 
conscience collective a more socially based understanding of dreams. In his late work Durkheim 
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attempted to show how the faculties of knowing are social, as opposed to the individual faculty 
theory of knowledge deriving from Kant. Yet Durkheim, too, remained tethered to the legacy of 
Kantian structuralism, in believing that: (1) a fundamental duality between individual 
consciousness and collective consciousness exists; (2) collective representations ultimately 
represent one fundamental, underlying, unchanging entity: society; and (3) collective 
representations are essentially conventional. These beliefs reveal why Durkheim remains 
inadequate to understand the social reality of dreaming. As opposed to Durkheim's claims: (1) 
individual consciousness is a social precipitate continuous with the collective biosocial heritage 
rather than dualistically opposed to it; (2) that which collective representations signify may 
emerge, grow, die, and undergo genuine transformation in time; and, finally, (3) as dream-
symbols make abundantly clear, collective representations are not limited to purely conventional 
signification, but they draw from other modalities of signification, such as iconic and indexical 
signs. 
The evolution of humans is marked by various anatomical changes, such as the development of 
the upright stance, the radical enlargement of the cranium and specifically the forebrain, and the 
creation of a vocal cavity with lowered larynx and subtle tongue and lip movements capable of 
producing an enormous variety of utterances. Speech is clearly one achievement of this process 
that uniquely identifies us as humans. But so too, for that matter, is artistic expression. Both are 
sign-practices dependent on the achievement of symbolic representation, and both reveal how to 
be human is to be a living, feeling, communicative symbol. Now a symbol, in the Peircean view 
I have adopted, is a social fact: a triadic relation whose meaning "depends either upon a 
convention, a habit, or a natural disposition of its interpretant or of the field of its interpretant" 
(Peirce 1958:8.335). In the case of the symbolic sign, as distinguished from iconic or indexical 
signs, the process of interpretation comes to the foreground, and, from a cultural perspective, this 
is to say that to be human is to be an interpreter. The very achievement of symbolic signification 
stands upon the vast capacities for pre- and protosymbolic communication developed by our 
forerunners and tempered into our physical organisms. And dreams may very well have provided 
the inner drama necessary to provoke us into interpretation by presenting images of a 
phantasmagoric "here and now," which break into the habits of everyday life. 
The neurophysiology of dreaming suggests that dreaming is the inner life of humanity in a 
virtually purified state: the inner conversation 
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of brain and mind. Brain "speaks" its ancient voices of phylogenetic experience through 
neurotransmitters that either emanate from the old "reptilian" brain and flow upward to the 
cortex, where visual, associative, and motor areas are excited (Hobson 1987:338–340), or, in the 
view of other researchers, through a reciprocal activation of the "old" brain centers with the 
"new," upper ones. In this process ancient neurophysical impulses become transformed into acts 
and associated meanings expressed in the images—whether visual or not—themselves. Iconic 
signification, which is to say the inherent presence or the communicative character of the sign 
itself, is the predominant language of this inner world, the meeting place of brain and mind. Yet, 
in contemporary humans, those icons of dreams are themselves frequently shaped from the 
reservoir of cultural experience and symbolic signification. The resources of mind and memory, 
incorporating both collective cultural experience, such as language, and personal experience play 
an active role in either consummating or frustrating the neurochemical dance. 
Dreaming is the cultic ground of mind, a communicative activity between the most sensitive 
archive of the enregistered experience of life on the earth, the brain, and the most plastic medium 
for the discovery and practice of meaning, the mind or culture. Most explanations of dreaming 
have tended to view it as ultimately passive, as a compensatory mechanism for daytime 
existence. In the Freudian view dreaming is the way that repressed wishes of the unconscious can 
be actively disguised through symbolism, thereby "venting" their energies in a way that will not 
undo consciousness. In many recent neurophysiological views, dreaming allows the recharging 
of the brain's neurochemical batteries. If human bodies were simply machines, these theories 
would perhaps be adequate. But it is important to realize that just as the mind is formative, 
generating new ideas collectively and individually, the brain, as the chief organ of mind, may 
also be formative or active. 
One wonders what the neurophysiologists' answers to other human activities might be: Why do 
we make music, images, and dance? Why does belief play such a central role in human affairs? 
Why can dreams wreak such havoc upon habituated experience and memory through fantastic 
associations or inversions? Why are all humans compelled to participate in these strange cults of 
the night? Why are such bizarre antics—the nightly Mad Hatter's party of REM sleep to which 
all are invited whether we remember it or not—absolutely necessary to our ability to function in 
the day world? When we begin to ask questions such as these, it becomes possible to turn the 
dream question around. In 
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other words, only by exploring that strange culture within us in its own terms, taking the 
"native's" point of view toward our inner life, can we begin to understand the alien within and 
our glassy essence. 
Perhaps dreaming itself is the purpose of dreaming, the end for which the neurophysiology is the 
means. As Milan Kundera writes in The Unbearable Lightness of Being, "Dreaming is not 
merely an act of communication (or coded communication, if you like); it is also an aesthetic 
activity, a game of the imagination, a game that is a value in itself. Our dreams prove that to 
imagine—to dream about things that have not happened—is among mankind's deepest needs." 
This interpretation may strike the reductionists among neurophysiologists and social theorists as 
too fantastic, but perhaps the fantastic is an inbuilt aspect of evolutionary reality, difficult though 
it may be to understand in our utilitarian age. 
Although it is frequently acknowledged that the unconscious is the source of creativity, it may be 
that dreaming, the night music of the soul, may also help generate new neural pathways. In other 
words, dream images may function as prospective symbols for mind, just as REM neural activity 
may function as neural network-making for brain: perhaps the two work in psychophysical 
relation, as might be indicated by the large proportion of time devoted to REM sleep in fetuses 
and infants, when the brain itself is rapidly growing. 
Lewis Mumford proposes that man's inner world "must often have been far more threatening and 
far less comprehensible than his outer world, as indeed it still is; and his first task was not to 
shape tools for controlling the environment, but to shape instruments even more powerful and 
compelling in order to control himself, above all, his unconscious. The invention and perfection 
of these instruments—rituals, symbols, words, images, standard modes of behavior (mores)—
was, I hope to establish, the principal occupation of early man, more necessary to survival than 
tool-making, and far more essential to his later development" (Mumford 1967:51). 
Although humanity has become increasingly conscious of itself, it has never stopped dreaming. 
Nor have its dreams become any less wondrous and terrifying. Communicative signs, not 
utilitarian tools, were the first human technics, created out of the human body itself, which was 
then and remains today the most sophisticated human achievement. 
If we consider then the influence of dreaming as creating a movement toward interpretative 
order, we can see how that process could 
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lead to an excess of order. When stretched beyond organic limits, such as life-purposes, local 
habitat, and local social organization, the tendency toward interpretation could take on a life of 
its own. Archaeological evidence suggests that proto- and early humans lived for the most part in 
environments that could localize and thereby neutralize the tendency to overreach for order or 
system. If we think of early cities and emergent civilizations as going beyond the earlier 
environmental resources and limits, we can suggest that the "megamachine"—reified, centralized 
order—was a product of that time, as Mumford claims, but that it was also a latent possibility 
already built into the human creature as a negative consequence of the dream-induced body 
technics. 
Biological evolution and cultural development are not simply a progressive casting off of 
shackles and a movement toward a greater and ultimately unrestrained freedom, but they involve 
trade-offs of one kind of limitation for another. The achievement of human symbolic 
consciousness may have cost us a somewhat diminished perceptual or emotional life: who is to 
say that the forms of feeling produced by Neanderthal burial rituals, and the dawning 
significance of death and mortality for Homo erectus and even earlier creatures, may not have 
more to do with the real essence of human symbolic consciousness than a modern rationalist 
treatise on culture produced by a human product of that consciousness? On the other hand, the 
Mozart and the Verdi Requiem provide ample evidence that the achievement of symbolic 
consciousness also enlarges and enhances perceptive and emotional capacities. There may have 
been a trade-off of emotive brain power in the overall reduction of brain size from earlier 
humans, such as Neanderthal, to Homo sapiens sapiens, but the subtilizing of brain through the 
enlargement of the forebrain may have provided compensation. One is reminded of Herman 
Melville's dictum: "Why then do you try to 'enlarge' your mind? Subtilize it." 
Mumford and only a very few other social theorists point to the unusual fact that our big brains 
seem possessed of excess energies and that this characteristic may explain a number of peculiar 
features of human existence. But there is an even more fundamental question that seems to me 
ignored, even though it goes to the crux of the evolutionary debate dating back to Darwin and 
Wallace: How did our big brains come about? It is not simply that we had big brains which we 
then had to control, but also that we evolved big brains, presumably through an evolutionary 
increase of brain use and adaptiveness. What was it that made big brains adaptive? Increasingly 
complex social organization? 
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Increasingly complex dreaming? Or both? Did the human brain evolve in the context of an 
evolving mind? Did mind, and not simply chance variation or adaptiveness, need more brains? 
Did the emergent symbolic consciousness need more forebrain and therefore "select" for the 
growth of this region? 
Is it possible that the idea of the megamachine goes back much farther again, back to the 
emergence of Homo sapiens sapiens? If protohumans evolved the tools of ritual, speech, artistic 
expression, and mores of conduct as means of controlling the inner anxieties, anxieties related to 
our big brains, perhaps the tendency to automatonlike order was also embedded in the central 
nervous system. Hence we would be creatures biologically impelled toward autonomy and 
meaning, as Mumford says, yet also biologically constructed to take the quest for meaning too 
far, thereby substituting order for meaning. The acquisition of meaning and autonomy may have 
been achieved at the cost of repetition compulsions or even the removal of biological inhibitions 
against overcentralization. Though cultural reductionists claim that human culture helped free us 
entirely from instincts, this view overlooks the possibility that human instincts continue to 
operate in vague and suggestive, yet vitally important, ways. Largely liberated from the genius of 
instinctive determination, we may be creatures neurologically constituted to walk the knife-edge 
between autonomy and the automaton, our task being, not to escape biology, but to make human 
autonomy instinctive. 
Or let me express this view in another way. Perhaps the symbol itself, as the medium of human 
consciousness, is so constituted, both in its freedom grounded in human conventions and in its 
mysterious relations to the central nervous system, that it needs to be connected to perceptive and 
critical—that is, lived—experience. Contrary to celebrated views of the symbol (or sign in 
Saussure's terminology) as completely "unmotivated" or arbitrary, I claim the symbol is that sign 
most dependent on vital and critical experience for its continued development. 
We live in signs and they live through us, in a reciprocal process of cultivation that I have 
elsewhere termed critical animism . If most tribal peoples have traditionally lived in a world of 
personified forces—or animism—and if this general outlook was evicted by the modern 
"enlightened" view of critical rationality and its "disenchanted" worldview, then I am proposing 
a new form of re-enchantment, or marriage, of these opposites. Critical animism suggests that 
rational sign-practices, though necessary to contemporary complex culture and human free- 
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dom, do not exhaust the "critical" and that the human impulse to meaning springs from 
extrarational and acritical sources of bodily social intelligence. 
The evolution of protohumans, though marked by the greater reliance on symbolic intelligence, 
did not necessarily mean the complete loss of instinctive intelligence as some theorists, such as 
Gehlen, have implied. On the contrary, one key aspect of the emerging symbolic intelligence "in 
the dreamtime long ago" may very well have been an instinctive, yet highly plastic or 
generalized, ability to listen to and learn from the rich instinctual intelligence of the surrounding 
environment. The close observation of birds, not only as prey but also as sources of delight, 
could also help to inform one of an approaching cold spell or severe winter. 
A better example might be the empathic relations to animals and natural phenomena shared by 
many tribal peoples. One frequently sees an identification with an animal or plant related to the 
practices of a people, such as the cult of the whale for fishing peoples, and a choice of an object 
that somehow symbolizes a central belief of a people, such as the white mudyi tree as a symbol 
of the milk of the matrilineally rooted Ndembu of Africa. There exists then a range from a 
practical, informing relationship to nature, or a fantastic elaboration of that relationship, to a 
purely symbolic relationship to the environment that either may be unrelated to the surrounding 
instinctual intelligence or that might even function as a kind of veil to obscure the informing 
properties of the environment. These relationships were crucial to the emergence of humankind: 
the deeply felt relationship to the organic, variegated biosphere, which was manifest in those 
natural signs or instincts of other species, and the corresponding pull away from the certainties of 
instinctual intelligence toward belief, toward humanly produced symbols that created a new 
order of reality, and in doing so, both amplified and layered over the voices of nature. 
Through mimesis, emerging humankind could become a plant or bird or reindeer, and thereby 
attune itself to the cycles of nature through the perceptions of these beings. A mimetic 
understanding also involves the generalizing of nature into symbolic form. A man dressed as a 
raven or bear at the head of a Kwakiutl fishing boat and the lionheaded human figurine found in 
Germany that dates back thirty-two thousand years (a very early find possibly suggesting 
interaction between Neanderthals and anatomically modern humans) signify the sym- 
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bolic incorporation of animal qualities into human activities and provoke human reflection, 
through what William James called the "law of dissociation," on the meaning of human 
activities. 
Dreaming is central to mimesis, and dreaming itself may be seen as an in-built form of 
"recombinant mimetics"—with all the power and danger of recombinant genetics—in which 
fantastic juxtapositions of neural pathways and cultural images and associations take place. 
Dreaming is perhaps the primal "rite of passage," through cult, to culture. 
In examining the brain-mind dialogue of dreaming we see a domain that bridges nature and 
culture, which may have been essential to the emergence of human symbolic culture and may 
remain essential to its continued development. In that sense dreaming opens an unexpected 
window onto the cultic roots of culture: the spontaneous springing forth of belief. And if 
Mumford is correct that dreaming may have impelled us toward a technics of symbolism both to 
control the anxieties produced by the inner world and to be animated by its imagemaking 
powers, then perhaps we can better understand the cultic origins of culture through examining 
the ritual symbol itself and the drama of communication that emerged from it. I cannot undertake 
that analysis here. But in indicating the line we big-brained apes must have followed in entering 
and establishing the human world, one conceivable consequence has, I hope, become somewhat 
clearer. The impulse to meaning is both original to our nature and ineradicable. 
Modern deratiocination, falsely termed rationalization by Max Weber, is that decontextualized 
form of rationality whose continued and unlimited growth involves the progressive elimination 
of the impulse to meaning. Its logical terminus is a closed rational system and stochastic 
indeterminacy. This is what Jürgen Habermas euphemistically calls "a progressive unfettering of 
the rationality potential inherent in communicative action" (1987 [1981]: 191). Contrary to 
Habermas's unshakable Enlightenment optimism, the unfettering of the limits of rationality led to 
Kundera's "unbearable lightness of being," which no new and improved "communicative" 
rationality is sufficient to correct. Dressed in our little, brief "rationalization," we become most 
ignorant of what we are most assured, our extrarational impulse to meaning, and cultural life 
withers as do rationalistic theories of culture. 
We are left, it seems to me, with centering our investigation of the roots of culture in the most 
sophisticated technics the world has yet known: those of the human body. Through human 
memory we have a profound connection to the past: to historical, prehistorical, and even 
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transhuman memory as the incorporation of organic experience. Living human memory, which is 
something quite different from mere nostalgia, makes it possible for collective and personal past 
experience to infuse its wisdom into the present and so generate new prospects for future 
conduct. No computer memory chip can help a computer to feel a novel situation, as human 
memory can, or to generate a truly novel interpretation. The generalization of human memory in 
myths, rituals, traditions and writing vastly broadened the spatiotemporal environment and 
human power. But power is double edged, and as Milan Kundera has said, "The struggle of man 
against power is the struggle of memory against forgetting." 
The origins of culture are to be found in those communicative practices through which emergent 
humanity literally bodied itself forth, creating a forebrain with language, speech, and personality 
capacities, creating a tongue, larynx, and throat capable of articulate speech, creating forms of 
expression, rituals of affliction and celebration, dramas of mythic, social, and personal 
communication, and stable institutions such as agriculture, villages, and later, cities, which have 
endured from Neolithic times to the present. The very expression "the culture and manurance of 
minds" may reflect the invention of manuring and its connection, through agriculture, to the 
development of permanent villages and protocities in the Neolithic Age. In other words, the very 
concept of culture may be an achievement and legacy of the Neolithic Age. Contemporary 
culture and culture theory seem intent on etherealizing these achievements out of existence and 
may very well succeed. 
No age proves more than ours what a dangerous thing a little knowledge can be. Overweening 
knowledge and technique have characterized the modern age, producing great and terrible ideas 
and powers. The modern age created new possibilities for autonomy and human freedom, ideals 
which more often than not turned into their opposites, but which yet might remain compelling. 
Yet the foundation of this nominalistic epoch has been a ghost in the machine worldview, which 
has increasingly displaced and devalued organic human purpose and the impulse to meaning. 
Modern nominalistic culture may be characterized as seeking to escape its organic roots through 
spectral theories of mind and mechanistic theories of matter. The chief task of a theory of culture 
today is to rediscover those extrarational, incarnate sources of meaning that the cult of modernity 
has now reduced to insignificance and to create a new outlook that can encompass humanity 
incarnate. This task is not a 
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retreat into "irrationalism" or biological reductionism but is a frank recognition that the beliefs of 
modern progress and modern rationality were built on false nominalistic premises: the reified 
view of nature as a mechanical system and the etherealized view of culture or mind as 
subjectivistic and set apart from nature. Human reason, in all its fullness, is in living continuity 
with the cultic roots of culture and is much more than merely rational. The cultic roots of culture, 
expressed in mother-infant bonding and those playful, dreamlike, inquisitive, and ritualistic 
forms of conduct, gradually impelled our protohuman ancestors to humanity and, whether we 
like it or not, remain deeply embedded sources of human cultures and conduct. 
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